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In the last several decades, ample evidence from across evolutionary biology, behavioural economics, and 
econophysics has solidified our knowledge that reputation can promote cooperation across different contexts 
and environments. Higher levels of cooperation entail higher final payoffs on average but how are these 
payoffs distributed among individuals? This study investigates how public and objective reputational 
information affects payoff inequality in repeated social dilemma interactions in large groups. We consider two 
aspects of inequality: excessive dispersion of final payoffs and diminished correspondence between final 
payoff and cooperative behaviour. We use a simple heuristics-based agent model to demonstrate that 
reputational information does not always increase the dispersion of final payoffs in strategically updated 
networks, and actually decreases it in randomly rewired networks. More importantly, reputational 
information almost always improves the correspondence between final payoffs and cooperative behaviour. 
We analyse empirical data from nine experiments of the repeated Trust, Helping, Prisoner’s Dilemma, and 
Public Good games in networks of ten or more individuals to provide partial support for the predictions. Our 





We, humans, have the distinctive ability to form complex social interaction and communication networks. 
These networks allow us to share information and cooperate with each other, achieving more collectively than 
any single individual could by themselves. In fact, scientists argue that our ability to gather and disseminate 
information about others is one of the reasons why we trust and help each other: that is, reputational 
information promotes cooperation. 
 
Reputation is the information about someone’s past behaviour that we obtain from direct observation, 
centralized institutions (reputation systems), or via social networks (gossip). In social dilemma situations 
where cooperation is individually undesirable but collectively beneficial, reputation allows cooperation to 
emerge via indirect reciprocity or reputation-based partner choice (1). Indirect reciprocity is the tendency to 
help individuals who have been helpful towards others, while reputation-based partner choice is the tendency 
to select helpful partners and avoid unhelpful ones. Indirect reciprocity is evolutionarily advantageous and 
thus, deeply ingrained in us (2, 3). Due to indirect reciprocity, individuals realize that their decisions affect 
their reputation, which in turn affects how others treat them in future interactions, and hence they become 
more likely to cooperate (4–6). Due to reputation-based partner choice, individuals increase their cooperation 
so that they are more likely to be chosen as partners and benefit from future interactions (1).  
 
By fostering cooperation, reputation increases individuals’ final payoffs on average and improves collective 
wealth. However, how are the payoffs distributed among different individuals? And do they reward 
cooperators more than defectors? These are essentially questions about inequality. The problem of inequality 
is one of the most fundamental problems modern organizations and societies face. Inequality decreases 
individual productivity and job satisfaction at the workplace, lowers organizational performance (7, 8), and 
more generally, negatively impacts happiness (9, 10) and health (11). Thus, a more comprehensive 
understanding of the effects of reputation systems on inequality would allow us to evaluate any potential 
tradeoffs and design more efficacious and sustainable organizations, institutions, online marketplaces, and 
social media communities. 
 
This study takes a major step in this direction by investigating the effect of reputational information on 
inequality in repeated social dilemmas in networks with different dynamics. We investigate inequality in 
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terms of the dispersion of final payoffs and the correspondence of final payoffs to cooperative behaviour. 
Looking through the lens of the co-evolution of reputations, social networks, and cooperation (12), we 
compare situations where individuals are randomly matched with new partners, such as speed dating events, 
round-robin tournaments, anonymous chat rooms, or rotating teams for school assignments and work 
projects, with situations where individuals can choose with whom they interact, such as online markets or 
self-assembled project teams. We argue that, when the networks are dictated by random matching, the higher 
levels of cooperation that reputation produces lower the dispersion of payoffs. However, when the networks 
are updated strategically, reputation fosters the clustering of cooperators and exclusion of defectors and thus 
may increase the dispersion of payoffs, yet reduce inequality in terms of better correspondence between 
payoffs and cooperative behaviour. We use an agent-based model to visualize the group-level expectations 




In non-cooperation settings, reputation has long been understood as a prominent mechanism for inequality. If 
we use a person’s past behaviour and performance to predict their future actions and achievements, 
reputation can produce a positive feedback loop whereby past accomplishments and resources turn into new 
accomplishments and resources. The process can cause initially small or accidental differences in behaviour 
and performance to compound and amplify over time. As a result, individual outcomes become less 
predictable and more extremely distributed. Merton studied this process in the context of academic success 
and famously labelled it “the Mathew effect” (13). The process is also known as “the rich get richer”, 
increasing returns, and cumulative advantage (14, 15).  
 
Reputation has been shown to create inequality in cooperation settings too. Hackel and Zaki (16) demonstrate 
that reputation serves to propagate existing inequalities in cooperation experiments. They find that 
participants tend to misattribute good reputation to those who have an arbitrary resource advantage that 
allows them to give more to others. As others rely on this reputational information to make investment 
decisions, they end up reproducing and reinforcing the inequalities in a different setting. Further, Frey and 
van de Rijt (17) provide evidence for reputation-driven cumulative advantage in experimental buyer-seller 
markets. The authors find that sellers who cooperate early get disproportionately rewarded because buyers 
are more likely to choose sellers of good repute. This implies that initial differences in cooperative behaviour 
could have long-lasting effects that get reinforced and exaggerated over time. As a result, social groups where 
information about past behaviour is available will have higher inequality than groups without reputation 
tracking. 
 
Evaluating inequality in the context of cooperation, however, is a complex problem. Cooperative behaviour is 
collectively beneficial and hence, valued and desirable. Importantly, cooperative behaviour is not necessarily 
inherent but conditional on others. If we disassociate individuals from the cooperative behaviour they exhibit, 
then we can measure inequality with the dispersion of final payoffs. In essence, if we consider differences in 
cooperative behaviours emergent, and hence, somewhat arbitrary, then a higher payoff difference between the 
wealthiest and the poorest would define higher inequality. On the other hand, however, if we hold 
individuals accountable for their cooperative behaviour, then inequality will depend on the extent to which 
payoffs correspond to cooperation. If we assume defectors willingly chose to defect, then situations where 
they end up better off compared to cooperators would be more unequal. This distinction between dispersion 
and correspondence parallels the contrast between dispersion and rank reversal that Freda Lynn and colleagues 
delineate in the context of status hierarchies (18). The underlying idea is that if we start with a population that 
is heterogeneous on a valued characteristic or behaviour, then inequality can take two forms: outcomes that 
are more dispersed than the underlying heterogeneity, and outcomes that correspond less to the valued 
characteristic or behaviour.    
 
Furthermore, in cooperation settings, reputation can have complex effects on inequality. On the one hand, we 
know that reputation tends to increase the level of cooperation. Starting from the initial rounds of interaction, 
individuals cooperate more due to forward-looking behaviour: aware that their reputation will affect others’ 
behaviour towards them in the future, they immediately start investing in it (4, 19). Over the course of 
interacting, individuals further learn from experience: they realize that being a reputable partner gives you an 
advantage and consequently, switch to cooperating (20). Since more uniform behaviour entails more similar 
individual outcomes, the higher levels of cooperation that reputation brings can lower the dispersion of final 
payoffs. Multiple studies confirm that reputation promotes cooperation in simple dyadic interactions (21–23) 
but there are also studies that fail to find the expected effect (24). 
 
Higher levels of cooperation will entail lower payoff dispersion if there is no segregation between cooperators 
and defectors. However, if reputation allows cooperators to find other cooperators and exclude defectors, the 
differences in payoffs between the two groups can widen. Simultaneously, the correspondence between 
payoffs and cooperative behaviour would improve. Indeed, previous research shows that individuals are 
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more likely to select partners who have reputation as cooperators (17), as well as more likely to cooperate with 
them (23, 25). At the group level, this implies that reputation will lead to networks with higher clustering by 
cooperativeness and higher degree centrality for cooperators. In fact, network experiments where payoff 
depends on the number of partners show the emergence of cooperative hubs as cooperative individuals attract 
higher number of connections (17, 19). The evidence for clustering by cooperativeness, however, is less 
convincing. Melamed et al. (26) find no effect from reputation on clustering as partner choice alone can induce 
near uniform cooperation.  Gallo and Yan (19) discover that reputational information needs to be combined 
with knowledge of the network in order for cooperators to cluster. 
 
One prior study that uses data from nine network cooperation experiments to investigate the effects of 
reputational information on the dispersion of final payoffs reports statistically significant effects in both the 
positive and negative directions, as well as near-zero effects (27). Here, we extend this work in a couple of 
ways. First, we present a more nuanced view of inequality by investigating both the dispersion of payoffs and 
the correspondence between payoffs and cooperative behaviour. Second, we pinpoint one specific factor that 
moderates the effect of reputational information on inequality: the dynamics of the underlying interaction 
network. We compare the effects of reputation under homogenous mixing in randomly rewired networks to 




We use an agent-based model to demonstrate how the effects of reputational information on payoff dispersion 
and correspondence may differ for different network dynamics. We rely on a generic and simple model that 
assumes agents follow fixed behavioural strategies and heuristic-based rules to respond to others’ actions and 
reputational information. The model we use intentionally avoids problematizing the evolution of cooperation 
(in contrast to most prior work) and instead takes it for granted in order to focus on how cooperation affects 
the distribution of payoffs. Our goal is to demonstrate the theoretical complexity of the phenomenon, rather 
than provide quantitative predictions for the empirical analyses.  
 
The agents in the model play an N-person Prisoner’s Dilemma game in which they choose between 
cooperating (C) and defecting (D) with payoffs for mutual cooperation 𝐶𝐶 = 5, mutual defection 𝐷𝐷 = 2, 
defecting with a cooperating partner 𝐷𝐶 = 8, and cooperating with a defecting partner 𝐶𝐷 = 0. Following 
empirical research on behavioural proclivities in the general population (28, 29), we assume that agents belong 
to three different fixed-strategy types: 𝑝! fraction are persistent defectors, 𝑝" are persistent altruists, and 𝑝# =
1 − 𝑝" − 𝑝! conditional cooperators. Altruists always cooperate, defectors never do, and conditional 
cooperators initially cooperate with some probability, after which they reciprocate by cooperating if at least a 
certain fraction of their interaction partners cooperated in the last period. While 𝑝" and 𝑝! define the 
minimum and maximum possible levels of cooperation, respectively, 𝑝# determines the proportion of 
responsive and interdependent agents, who exhibit more realistic variation in behaviour and drive the 
system’s emergent properties.      
 
Agents interact in a network of size 𝑁 and average node degree 𝑚. To compare the effect of network 
dynamics, we study two modes of network updating. For the randomly rewired networks, agents are placed 
in a new network every period. For the strategically updated networks, every period each agent is given the 
opportunity to replace one of their defecting neighbours with someone else. An existing link gets deleted if 
one of the two agents drops it, but for a new link to appear, both agents need to desire it. To facilitate mutual 
nominations but avoid skewed degree distributions, we assume that agents can nominate multiple new 
potential partners, as long as the number of actual partners does not exceed 2𝑚.   
 
To avoid stochastically unstable outcomes, we assume a small probability for error 𝜀 = 0.005 such that the 
agent executes an action that is opposite to the one they originally chose, and another small probability for 
error 𝛾 = 0.005 such that the agent does not update their network even if they have decided to. 
 
We study the outcomes in networks with random rewiring and strategic updating when there is no 
reputational information and when reputation is provided as the average action over the last 𝑟 periods. When 
reputational information is available, forward-looking individuals are more likely to cooperate when they are 
aware of the negative consequences from reputation as a non-cooperator (4, 19, 26). We implement this by 
specifying that conditional cooperators initially cooperate with probability 𝜃$ + 𝑎$𝑟, and then cooperate if at 
least 𝜃% − 𝑎%𝑟 of their neighbours cooperated over the last 𝑟 periods, where 𝜃$ and 𝜃% are the behavioural 
thresholds without reputation and 𝑎$ and 𝑎% define the strength of the reputation effects (0 < 𝜃$, 𝜃% , 𝑎$, 𝑎% <
1). Reputational information also comes in play when agents select new partners (17, 19, 26). Without 
reputational information, agents pick new partners randomly from those with whom they are not yet linked. 
Otherwise, they pick only among those who have cooperated in at least 𝜃% of the past 𝑟 periods. 
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For the results we report here, we fix the initial tendency to cooperate  𝜃$ = 𝑝", that is, we assume that the 
willingness to cooperate on first encounter is equal to the probability of encountering an unconditional 
cooperator. Additionally, we fix the subsequent cooperation threshold  𝜃% = 0.5 and the reputation effects 
𝑎$ = 0.1 and 𝑎% = 0.05. Generally, higher 𝜃$, 𝑝", 𝑎$, 𝑎% and lower 𝜃% increase the rate at which cooperation 
emerges and the equilibrium level of cooperation. The specific values were chosen because they produce 
sufficient variation in the level of cooperation and replicate the empirically validated expectation that 
reputational information and strategic network updating independently increase the level of cooperation (Fig. 
S1A, S2A, S3A). Further, we assume that agents are initially embedded in a random network, where an 
interaction link between any pair of nodes is formed with a small fixed probability; this produces initial 
networks with low clustering and Poisson degree distributions, where we fix the network size 𝑁 = 100 and 
average node degree 𝑚 = 2. We also assume that payoffs are averaged over all interactions in a period and, 
hence, do not depend on the number of interaction partners. The model allows to modify the assumptions 
about the initial network structure, average node degree 𝑚 (see Fig.S1), payoff function (Fig.S2), and 




Figure 1. A) Agent-based models reveal that reputation (shown in red) generally decreases the dispersion of 
payoffs in randomly rewired networks but might increase it in networks with strategic updating when the 
percentage of steady defectors is sufficiently high. B) Reputation almost always results in better 
correspondence between payoffs and cooperative behaviour. The plots show (A) the mean Gini coefficient of 
accumulated payoffs and (B) the mean Pearson correlation between proportion of periods when cooperating 
and final payoff when no reputational information is available (𝑟 = 0; grey) and when agents know 
everyone’s actions in the previous period (𝑟 = 1; red). The means are calculated over 1000 runs in networks of 
𝑁 = 100 agents who start interaction in a random network with 𝑚 = 2 partners on average and play for 𝑇 =
100 periods. The simulations vary the percent of steady defectors (x-axis) and steady altruists (y-axis), with 
the rest being conditional cooperators. 
 
 
Although the model is simple enough to be solved analytically, we focus here on visualizing our theoretical 
intuition and demonstrating the variability of outcomes expected for a range of cooperation outcomes due to 
changes in the proportion of persistent altruists, persistent defectors, and conditional cooperators. We 
measure inequality in terms of dispersion with the Gini coefficient of the payoffs accumulated after 𝑇 = 100 
periods. The Gini coefficient is 0 when all individuals have equal payoffs and 1 when only a single individual 
has a non-zero payoff. We measure inequality in terms of correspondence with the Pearson correlation 
between the proportion of periods in which the agent cooperated and the agent’s final payoff. A Pearson 
correlation of 1 means that higher cooperation is always proportionally rewarded with higher payoffs, while a 
Pearson correlation of –1 indicates perfect inverse proportionality.   
 
A) Dispersion of payo↵s
Random rewiring Strategic updating
B) Correspondence between payo↵s and behaviour
Random rewiring Strategic updating
1
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The model comparing outcomes for 𝑟 = 0 and 𝑟 = 1 confirms our intuition (Fig. 1). The results indicate that 
reputational information decreases the dispersion of payoffs in randomly rewired networks but could increase 
it in strategically updated networks when persistent defectors are numerous (Fig. 1A). In randomly rewired 
networks, the Gini coefficient is always low but reputation brings it even lower because conditional 
cooperators can make agents pay back for last-period’s defection. In strategically updated networks, the Gini 
increases with higher proportions of persistent altruists in the absence of reputation but with higher 
proportions of persistent defectors when reputational information is available. The reason is that reputation 
allows the complete isolation of defectors, while its lack does not prevent the exploitation of altruists. 
 
Although reputational information can increase the dispersion of payoffs in strategically updated networks 
under certain conditions, it almost always provides better correspondence between payoffs and cooperative 
behaviour, regardless of the network dynamics (Fig. 1B). With strategic updating, reputation guarantees that 
defectors are excluded and thus suffer, while cooperators prosper. Under random rewiring, even though 
reputation rarely produces positive rewards to cooperation, it still reduces the rewards for defection by 
making payoffs less negatively correlated with cooperative behaviour. In short, reputational information 
combined with the strategic choice of partners could increase the dispersion of payoffs but this is because 
persistent defectors deservingly lose out. 
 
Data and methods 
 
We provide empirical evidence for the theoretical expectations with data from nine network cooperation 
experiments (Table 1). These experiments were originally designed to study the effect of reputational 
information on the emergence of cooperation and the published articles associated with them do not report on 
inequality. We identified these studies after conducting online searches on the Scopus database, the Google 
Scholar search engine, and the Cooperation Databank (30). Specifically, we searched for network cooperation 
experiments that involve the repeated play of a social dilemma game in networks of at least 10 and that 
manipulate the information available on other participants’ past actions. We only considered accurate and 
objective information, excluding studies with gossip or subjective ratings. We identified ten studies and after 
contacting the corresponding authors, obtained data for nine of them (with (19) missing). 
 
 




Experim. Game: payoffs Ni Nn N T Network m Updating Reputation
BOLT04 TG: 50, 70, 35 144 9 16 30 pair 1 random 0, all
BOLT05a HG:  0.25, 1.25 96 6 16 14 pair 1 random 0, 1, 1+1
BOLT05b HG:  0.75, 1.25 96 6 16 14 pair 1 random 0, 1, 1+1
SEIN06 HG:  150, 250 112 8 14 >90 pair 1 random 1, 6
STAH13 PD: 80, 10, 90, 20 92 8 22, 24 24, 39 pair 1 random 0, 1
BAYE16a PG: 100  ci + 0.8
P
cj 224 12 16–20 24 pair 1 random 0, last
CUES15 PD: 7, 0, 10, 0 243 22 17–25 25 (cycle) (4) strategic 0, 1, 3, 5
BAYE16b PG: 100  ci + 0.8
P
cj 224 12 16–20 24 pair 1 disincent. strategic 0, last
BAYE16c PG: 100  ci + 0.8
P
cj 224 12 16–20 24 pair 1 incent. strategic 0, last
KAME17a PG: 10  ci + 0.65
P
cj 120 12 10 40 pair 1 strategic 0, part, avg
KAME17b PG: 10  ci + 0.85
P
cj 130 13 10 40 pair 1 strategic 0, part, avg
HARR18a tPD: 50,  50, 100, 0 334 20 12–24 12 (random) (4) part strategic 0, avg
HARR18b tPD: 50,  50, 100, 0 334 20 12–24 12 (random) (4) strategic 0, avg
MELA18a PD: 50,  50, 100, 0 810 15 19–28 16 (random) (4) strategic 0, loc, avg
MELA18b PD: 50,  50, 100, 0 810 15 19–28 16 (clustered) (4) strategic 0, loc, avg
MELA18c tPD: 50,  50, 100, 0 810 15 19–28 16 (random) (4) strategic 0, loc, avg
MELA18d tPD: 50,  50, 100, 0 810 15 19–28 16 (clustered) (4) strategic 0, loc, avg
MELA18e PD: 50,  50, 100, 0 472 16 19–28 16 (random) (4) slow strategic 0, loc, avg
MELA18f tPD: 50,  50, 100, 0 472 14 19–28 16 (random) (4) slow strategic 0, loc, avg
The games played in the experiments are Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD), targeted Prisoner’s Dilemma (tPD), Public Good (PG), Helping (HG),
and Trust (TG) game. Payoffs are shown for CC, CD, DC, DD for PD and CC, CD, D for TG. For HG, the payoff numbers correspond
to cost, benefit for the gift and for PG, ci (cj ) is the amount contributed by the player (all players) to the public good. Ni = number of
unique participants, Nn = number of networks, N = network size, T = number of periods. Network refers to network structure, m—the
number of interaction partners, and updating—how the network is updated. Values in brackets refer to the network in the first period
only. Reputation refers to reputation tracking with the number indicating the number of previous periods over which partner’s actions are
observed; all = observe all actions in previous periods; avg = observe average behavior over all previous periods; last = observe average
behavior over previous four-period-long phase; part = observe average behavior over 50% of previous periods; loc = observe average




Our choice to re-analyse existing data, instead of developing bespoke experiments, has some advantages, as 
well as disadvantages. On the positive side, we insure ourselves against Type I errors, or falsely reporting 
positive effects, because none of the studies could have been cherry-picked to report significant results with 
respect to the dependent variables. In addition, the repurposed data allow us to affirm the robustness of our 
findings across different experimental setups, incentives, and participant pools; this will be prohibitively 
expensive to do from scratch. Still, on the negative side, we risk Type II errors, i.e., failing to find true 
positives, because the experiments were not calibrated to produce the highest variation in the outcome of 
interest, nor scaled up sufficiently for group-level analyses. We can only test the predictions qualitatively, not 
quantitatively, because the model and experiments vary in more than one aspect. Finally, we can only do an 
indirect test of the predictions because only one experiment crosses reputational information with random 
rewiring and strategic updating. Consequently, we analyse the effect of reputation separately in randomly 
rewired and strategically updated networks. 
 
The experiments use one of four common social dilemma games: the Trust (TG), Helping (HG), Prisoner’s 
Dilemma (PD), or Public Good (PG) game. The TG is most intuitively understood in the context of buyer-seller 
relationships, where the buyer (trustor) decides whether to send a sum of money to the seller (trustee), and if 
so, the seller gets to choose whether to ship the purchased item, i.e., send something of value back, or not. 
Honoured trust (CC) is mutually beneficial but abusing trust (CD) is tempting for the trustee. In the HG, the 
player decides whether to give a gift of a cost c to another player who will benefit b, where giving is 
collectively beneficial (b > c) but not guaranteed to be reciprocated. In the PG, players invest in a common pot 
and then share the multiplied investments equally. In the PD, players choose either to cooperate or defect, 
where mutual cooperation (CC) is collectively beneficial but individually unprofitable because defecting (DC 
or DD) is always the better choice, regardless of what the other player does. 
 
For random rewiring, we analyse six different network cooperation experiments from five studies (21–23, 31, 
32). The experiments randomly re-match pairs of participants at regular intervals in networks of 14-24. For 
strategic updating, we analyse 13 experimental setups from five studies (20, 25, 26, 32, 33). Typically, the 
interaction starts in a network with a certain structure and density and throughout the game, participants are 
given the opportunity to drop some of their current interaction partners and select new ones. In the 
experiments using the PD, participants play the dyadic game with each of their partners; thus, each 
participant’s payoff depends on the number of partners, as well as their actions. In some of these experiments 
the participant chooses one action and plays it against all their partners, while in others, they can choose a 
different action against each partner (shown as tPD, or targeted PD, in Table 1). The one experiment that 
manipulates both reputational information and network updating (32) uses a dyadic PG where partners are 
updated (randomly assigned or strategically chosen in the different treatments) every four periods. 
 
The experiments manipulate the amount of information available about other players’ past actions beyond 
knowledge of what one’s partners did in the previous round. In the control condition, no such information is 
available and in (25), even information about what one’s own partners individually chose in the previous 
period is missing. To provide reputational information, some of the experiments reveal to participants what 
their current or potential partners did in the past 𝑟 periods, where 𝑟 = 1, 3, 5, 6, or all previous periods. Other 
experiments show the average rate of cooperation/contribution over all previous periods (avg), over half of 
previous periods selected at random (part avg), or over the last four-period game phase (last avg). One study 
shows the average rate of cooperation over all previous periods but only towards one’s partners’ partners (loc 
avg). Another study includes information on the action of the partner’s partner to which one’s partner 
responds (abbreviated as 1+1). 
 
For the analyses, we measure final payoff with the number of in-game monetary units the player accumulated 
at the end of the game. As in the model, we use the Gini coefficient to measure the dispersion of final payoffs. 
The Gini coefficient is particularly suited in this case because it is invariant to scale, which helps us compare 
outcomes across experiments with very different incentive structures (34). Analogously, we use the Pearson 
correlation coefficient between the rate of cooperation and final payoff to measure the correspondence 
between behaviour and rewards.  
 
To test the effects of reputational information on inequality, we compare the Gini and Pearson correlation 
coefficients in the conditions with reputational information to the baseline condition without. We use the 
Mann-Whitney test to assess the differences in each control-treatment pair. This is a non-parametric test that 
does not assume a normal distribution for the residuals. It essentially checks against the null hypothesis that a 
randomly selected value from one condition would be equally likely to be less than or greater than a 
randomly selected value from the other condition. 
 
Since the experiments were not designed to test group-level hypotheses, we do not always have large enough 
effect sizes and statistical power to provide evidence at the level of a single experiment. Hence, we 
additionally conduct a meta-analysis across all control-treatment pairs using the sign test (35). We first count 
the number of positive and negative effects, regardless of whether they are statistically significant. We then 
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conduct the Binomial test, testing against the null hypothesis that there is no effect in reality and thus negative 
and positive effects are equally likely to occur by chance. This approach is somewhat limited because it does 
not take into account the amount of evidence: neither the effect magnitudes nor the sample sizes. However, 
our goal is not to estimate an effect size but test a causal relationship. We note that effect sizes are not very 
meaningful in controlled social experiments as they are highly sensitive to aspects of the experimental design 
such as the framing of the decision situation, the monetary incentives, the experience of the participant pool, 




We first test the prediction that reputational information lowers the dispersion of payoffs in randomly rewired 
networks. Using Mann-Whitney tests to compare the Gini coefficients for payoffs accumulated at the end of 
interactions between the control and treatment conditions, we find statistically significant evidence for this 
prediction in BOLT04, SEIN06, and STAH13 (Fig. 2A). Overall, the effect direction is as predicted in seven out 




Figure 2. A) The empirical analyses confirm that reputational information decreases the dispersion of final 
payoffs in randomly rewired networks. B) As predicted, in networks with strategic updating, reputational 
information could increase the dispersion of final payoffs, as in CUES15, but this does not occur in most cases.  
The figure shows boxplots of the Gini coefficient for final payoffs for each experimental condition and results 
from Mann-Whitney tests comparing each condition with reputation to the control condition (reputation = 0) 
in each experiment (Mann-Whitney U on top and 2-sided p-value on bottom, with asterisk if p < 0.05). 
Description of the experimental setups and treatment conditions can be found in Table 1.  
 
 
Next, we investigate whether reputational information could increase the dispersion of payoffs in strategically 
updated networks. We find statistically significant supporting evidence only in CUES15 (Fig. 2B). Out of the 
23 control-treatment pairs, only ten have a positive effect from reputation on inequality, resulting in 2-sided p 
= 0.678 for the sign test. It is worth noting that this result is skewed by eight of the pairs from MELA18 where 
groups achieve nearly universal cooperation within a couple of periods and consequently, end up with little 
variation in final payoffs (Fig.S4). Nevertheless, even after excluding these outliers, we are left with results in 
both directions (8 positive out of 13, 2-sided p = 0.999). In sum, although possible, reputation is unlikely to 
produce higher inequality in strategically updated networks. This finding corroborates previous research 
showing that reputation does not contribute much to the clustering and proliferation of cooperators beyond 
what the possibility to exclude defecting partners can already do (26). The positive effect we find in CUES15 is 
likely contingent on two design decisions in the experiment: 1) the assumption that memory is a source of 
reputation, such that in the no reputation condition, individuals do not know even their own partners’ actions, 
and 2) the payoff matrix with CD = DD, which means that cooperators do not lose by interacting with 
defectors. Because of these two assumptions, exclusion does not occur when reputation = 0, evidenced by the 
fact that the networks have much higher density then (25).  
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Regarding the expected positive effect of reputational information on the correspondence between payoffs 
and cooperative behaviour, we find supporting evidence that is statistically significant in BOLT04, SEIN06, 
STAH13, CUES15, and KAME17a (Fig.3). The overall results, however, are not statistically significant for 
randomly rewired networks (6/8, 1-sided p = 0.145) and significant for strategically updated networks only if 
we remove the eight outliers from MELA18 (12/15, 1-sided p = 0.018). Figures S5 and S6 show in more detail 





This study aimed to expand our understanding of the effects of reputation systems in social groups. 
Complementing prior research, which focuses on cooperation and collective welfare, we investigated how 
reputational information affects inequality. We studied inequality in terms of both the dispersion and fairness 
of rewards: we analysed how the final payoffs of the poorest differ from those of the richest but also, how the 
final payoffs correspond to cooperative behaviour. Overall, our aim was to answer the question of whether 
reputation systems pose a tradeoff between efficiency and equality: Do the higher levels of cooperation and 
higher collective wealth imply undesirable side effects that have been overlooked? We argued and 
demonstrated with an agent-based model that reputation may increase the dispersion of payoffs under some 
conditions in strategically updated networks, but almost always decreases it in randomly rewired networks; it 
also provides better rewards to cooperative behaviour regardless of the dynamics of the interaction network. 
 
We hypothesized and found partial empirical evidence that reputational information decreases inequality in 
interaction situations where partners are periodically randomly re-matched. Markets driven by one-off 
transactions that employ some form of randomization in allocating sellers to buyers exemplify such situations. 
Ride-hailing services such as Uber and Lyft present a good case in point, as they match drivers with customers 
based on time availability, which introduces a component of randomness. Networks that are periodically 
randomly rewired can also occur in schools and work environments, when teachers and managers randomly 
allocate students or employees to team projects. In this kind of networks, reputation increases the level of 
cooperation but also the rewards for cooperating, and this diminishes the dispersion of final payoffs. In other 
words, in randomly rewired networks, reputation works even better than we thought: it benefits both 




Figure 3. Reputational information generally improves the correspondence of payoffs to cooperation. The 
overall effect, however, is only significant in strategically updated networks (B) if we exclude MELAa-d, 
where the level of cooperation is > 95%. The figure shows boxplots of the Pearson correlation between final 
payoffs and individual cooperation, the latter defined as the proportion of periods in which the participant 
chose to cooperate. The text shows results from Mann-Whitney tests comparing each condition with 
reputation to the control condition (reputation = 0) in each experiment (Mann-Whitney U on top and 2-sided 
p-value on bottom, with asterisk if p < 0.05).  
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In interaction situations where individuals strategically choose their partners, we predicted that reputational 
information increases the dispersion of payoffs only under restricted conditions and indeed, we found that 
this is not common empirically. More importantly, just as in randomly rewired networks, in networks with 
strategic updating, reputation increases the rewards to cooperators and any increase in the dispersion of 
payoffs occurs at the expense of defectors, who are excluded and isolated. Yet, in practice, as (26) argue, 
strategic updating can already induce segregation between cooperators and defectors, and reputation does not 
contribute additionally. Thus, even in situations where partners are strategically selected, reputation systems 
appear to improve equality and fairness. 
 
Our study extends and qualifies previous research showing that reputation systems could produce arbitrary 
and enduring inequalities in social dilemma situations (16, 17). Our fist contribution is to introduce, in 
addition to the dispersion of payoffs, another dimension to consider when analysing inequality in cooperation 
settings – the correspondence between payoffs and cooperative behaviour. This dimension is important to the 
extent to which we attribute cooperative behaviour to structural constraints and incentives, rather than 
individual agency. If cooperation is enabled by an arbitrary resource advantage (16) or constrained by the lack 
of opportunities to act (17), correspondence is less meaningful. When everyone faces the same decision 
situation, however, our sense of justice and fairness tells us that rewards should correspond to actions and this 
becomes an important consideration for inequality. 
  
Our second contribution to existing research was to account for the multiplicity of equilibria. We 
accomplished this by presenting a generic model that considers different combinations of individual strategies 
and analysing experiments with different incentives and setups. This approach does not allow us to explain 
differences in the results between the model and any specific experiment, or between any pair of experiments, 
due to the fact that the model and the experiments differ on more than one dimension. Nevertheless, the 
approach allowed us to theoretically isolate the main driving factors behind the phenomenon we study – the 
emergent level of behaviour, the variability in individual behaviour, and the assortativity between individuals 
with similar behaviour – and to test the frequency and robustness of the predictions under variable empirical 
settings. Our work brings attention to the danger of drawing strong conclusions from a single model or 
experiment. Specifically, although prior research offers empirical evidence for the intuitive expectation that 
strategic partner selection increases inequality in terms of payoff dispersion (17), we revealed that this 
outcome is in fact rare for most network cooperation settings.    
 
We acknowledge that the results presented here are not conclusive and that further research is needed. The 
biggest limitation of our study is that the empirical results regarding strategically updated networks are based 
only on symmetrical games, where both parties choose partners and face the same decision situation. What is 
more, the networks were degree-constrained, such that most individuals had a similar number of interaction 
partners. For example, this is the case when students team up for a course project. In contrast, buyer-seller 
markets involve asymmetric relations and preferential attachment, and research of such settings suggests that 
reputation systems could produce enduring inequalities (17, 37, 38). Our study could be extended with a 
bespoke experiment that investigates the effects of reputational information on inequality in strategically 
updated networks for both symmetric and asymmetric social dilemma games, systematically varying the 
maximum number of possible partners. This would test whether the negative effects of reputation on 
inequality are contingent on preferential attachment and exclusion, which prevent the opportunity to modify 
behaviour. 
 
Overall, our present finding that reputation systems rarely worsen inequality in social dilemma situations in 
degree-constrained networks and, in fact, improve it under most conditions and in terms of rewarding 
cooperative behaviour suggests that it is possible to benefit from reputation systems without undesirable side 
effects. If reputation is used to encourage defectors to cooperate, rather than punish and isolate them, then 
everyone will be better off. We could achieve this by, for instance, implementing smart search algorithms in 
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Figure S1. (A) The level of cooperation, (B) the dispersion of final payoffs, and (C) the correspondence 
between payoffs and cooperative behaviour in the agent-based model where networks are denser. The values 
are means calculated over 1000 runs in networks of 100 agents who have average node degree 𝑚 = 5 and 
interact for 100 periods. Gray shows results without reputational information (𝑟 = 0), red – results when 
agents know everyone’s actions in the previous period (𝑟 = 1). The simulations varied the percent of steady 
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Figure S2. (A) The level of cooperation, (B) the dispersion of final payoffs, and (C) the correspondence 
between payoffs and cooperative behaviour in the agent-based model where payoffs are summed over all 
interactions in a period (rather than averaged). The values are means calculated over 1000 runs in networks of 
100 agents who have average node degree 𝑚 = 2 and interact for 100 periods. Gray shows results without 
reputational information (𝑟 = 0), red – results when agents know everyone’s actions in the previous period 
(𝑟 = 1). The simulations varied the percent of steady defectors (x-axis) and steady altruists (y-axis), with the 
rest being conditional cooperators. 
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Figure S3. (A) The level of cooperation, (B) the dispersion of final payoffs, and (C) the correspondence 
between payoffs and cooperative behaviour in the agent-based model where reputational information covers 
more periods. The values are means calculated over 1000 runs in networks of 100 agents who have average 
node degree 𝑚 = 2 and interact for 100 periods. Gray shows results without reputational information (𝑟 = 0), 
red – results when agents know everyone’s actions in the previous three periods (𝑟 = 3). The simulations 
varied the percent of steady defectors (x-axis) and steady altruists (y-axis), with the rest being conditional 
cooperators. The left-hand plots are identical to the left-hand plots in Figure 1 since they are generated with 
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Figure S4. Group-level analyses replicate previously reported individual-level findings that reputational 
information increases cooperation: (A) 1-sided p = 0.035 from sign test for random rewiring; (B) 1-sided p = 
0.005 from sign test for strategic updating. The effects of reputation are less pronounced for networks with 
strategic updating compared to networks with random rewiring because, there, cooperation could be nearly 
universal even without reputation. The figure shows boxplots for each experimental condition and results 
from Mann-Whitney tests comparing each condition with reputation to the control condition (reputation = 0) 
in each experiment (Mann-Whitney U on top and 2-sided p-value on bottom, with asterisk if p < 0.05). 
















Figure S5. Empirical data from experiments on networks with random rewiring reveal that reputational 
information increases both the incidence of cooperation and the rewards for cooperating, skewing the 
distribution of final payoffs to higher values; as a result, the dispersion of final payoffs decreases, while the 
correspondence between payoffs and cooperative behaviour improves. The figure shows scatter plots for 
individuals’ final payoffs by cooperation, as well as the distribution of final payoffs and the distribution of 
individual cooperation. Individual cooperation is defined as the proportion of periods in which the participant 
chose to cooperate. Lines show best linear fit for each interaction group and numbers show the standardized 
coefficient (top) and 2-sided p-value (bottom) estimated in ordinary least-square regression models with 











Figure S6. Empirical data from experiments on networks with strategic updating show that similarly to 
networks with random rewiring (Fig.S5), reputational information often increases both the incidence of 
cooperation and the rewards for cooperating. However, in contrast, the distribution of final payoffs does not 
change overall shape, with the exception of CUES15, where it becomes more stretched at the upper end.  The 
figure shows scatter plots for individuals’ final payoffs by cooperation, as well as the distribution of final 
payoffs and the distribution of individual cooperation. Individual cooperation is defined as the proportion of 
periods in which the participant chose to cooperate. Lines show best linear fit for each interaction group and 
numbers show the standardized coefficient (top) and 2-sided p-value (bottom) estimated in ordinary least-
square regression models with standard errors clustered by group. 
 
